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I. Introduction
In the spring of 2016, a group of developers
put forth a proposal for a decentralized
autonomous organization (DAO — this term and
others will be explained below). The purpose of
this DAO, which was called “The DAO,” was to
collect funds for investment in new ventures. The
investors, through the Ethereum blockchain
platform (upon which The DAO was constructed),
would decide where The DAO’s funds would be
invested and would share in the profits of the
1
enterprise.
Unfortunately, a programming error left open
the possibility for The DAO’s funds to be diverted
to a rogue individual’s account. This did indeed
happen, and perhaps one-third of The DAO’s
funds were diverted. To mitigate the potential
effects of a diversion, the Ethereum community
voted to have a “hard fork” of the Ethereum chain,
2
creating two Ethereum chains into the future.
To add insult to injury, the SEC used this DAO
to explain for the first time its view that some
blockchain-related issuances would be considered
securities subject to SEC regulation.3
Although this specific DAO wasn’t successful,
entrepreneurs continue to use the blockchain
structure to raise funds and deploy those funds
for the benefit of their investors. It has been
1

Christopher Jentzsch, “The History of The DAO and Lessons
Learned,” Slock.it blog, Aug. 24, 2016.
2
3

Id.
SEC Release No. 81207 (July 25, 2017).
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suggested that such a structure could be used to
create the equivalent of corporations.4 Several
5
DAOs have already been formed.
Absent from the discussion of DAOs is any
consideration of how these new structures mesh
with the U.S. tax system. An examination of what
constitutes a DAO quickly reveals that there are
significant tax issues raised by these structures.
By describing how The DAO was intended to
function, I hope to make clear what these issues
are.
II. DAOs and Their Terminology
A. The Blockchain
Many have written about the blockchain,
particularly because Bitcoin, blockchain’s initial
6
application, has grabbed the public’s
imagination. The following description, while
incomplete, is intended to make the discussion of
DAOs understandable to those previously
unfamiliar with them.
Traditionally, if a system is to keep track of the
ownership of assets, it needs a central authority to
record ownership and thus provide assurance to
the owners and potential purchasers that the
property is really there and that ownership can be
transferred uniquely. Think, for example, of a
government agency with which land ownership
must be recorded, a corporation whose stock
ledger keeps track of its shareholders, or a bank
that records the funds in its depositors’ accounts.
The blockchain dispenses with the need for a
central authority by making public the ledger

4

See, e.g., Vitalik Buterin, “Bootstrappping a Decentralized
Autonomous Corporation: Part I” (Sept. 19, 2013); and Buterin, “DAOs,
DACs, DAs, and More: An Incomplete Terminology Guide” (May 6,
2014). As a matter of terminology, the DAOs I discuss in this report are
ones, like The DAO, that are most like a corporation, making
distributions and allowing owners to obtain their investment in return
from the entity.
5

E.g., SolarDAO (its white paper describes the proposed project and
notes that it plans “to keep data on shareholders in a smart contract on
Ethereum”); DAOStack; Wings; XWIN (not offered to U.S. persons);
and ETF Token. Not all entities that identify as DAOs are using the
blockchain structure to keep track of their investors. See, e.g., Databroker
DAO white paper (“Databroker DAO will be run using a traditional
company structure, until such a time we, in active collaboration with the
community and industry, can determine a governance model that works
for all parties involved.”).

showing the assets within its domain. In the
classic blockchain, no one viewing this ledger
would be able to identify the owner of any of the
assets listed in the ledger. However, using
cryptographic methods, only the owner of the
asset can transfer it to another person. The owner
has a “digital key” (which is like a password or
PIN) that can uniquely be used to transfer the
asset. Thus, the owner can show a potential buyer
that the asset exists, because it is listed in the
publicly available ledger. The person claiming to
be the owner then proves ownership by being able
to transfer the item to the transferee’s account.
A crucial aspect of this system is that for the
transfer to be accepted by the community
participating in this system, a complicated
mathematical problem must be solved. A correct
solution must be confirmed by members of the
community. As each group (or “block”) of
transfers is confirmed, it is added to the chain of
all transactions, and the updated ledger is kept by
each member of the community. It is the public
nature of the ledger, and the fact that transactions
must be confirmed, that prevents the introduction
of a counterfeit transfer into the structure.
Because maintaining the honesty of the system
depends on solving mathematical problems,
those that find solutions (miners) are given a
reward. In the bitcoin system, as in many other
blockchain systems, the reward consists of a unit
of the property that is recorded in the ledger — in
this case, a newly minted bitcoin.
One possible flaw in this system is that a
group could obtain sufficient voting power to
approve a transaction that transfers assets to
them. This “51-percent attack” is combated by
having a sufficiently large group of persons in the
blockchain’s community reviewing and
7
confirming transactions.
B. Smart Contracts
The system described above is relatively
simple, to the extent that it deals only with
transfers of assets from one person to another. But
the blockchain can also be used to record more

6

The description of Bitcoin, and the innovative blockchain structure
on which bitcoin is run, was set forth in the pseudonymous paper,
Satoshi Nakamoto, “Bitcoin: A Peer-To-Peer Electronic Cash System”
(Oct. 31, 2008).

7

See Jan Hendrik Witte, “The Blockchain: A Gentle Introduction”
(Nov. 2016). Depending on the blockchain’s rules, this problem does not
necessarily arise at a 51 percent ownership level.
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complicated transactions: those effected through
smart contracts.
A smart contract is one whose terms are
reflected in a computer program or, more
generally, in a machine. All provisions, including
execution and enforcement, are carried out
automatically and without human intervention. It
was early described in the simple context of a
8
vending machine. When you put money into a
vending machine and buy a bottle of soda, the
seller is not around to confirm your purchase. The
seller has simply set up its machine so that it
recognizes when sufficient funds have been
deposited to allow for the release of a container of
soda and any change owed you.
But the current state of smart contracts goes
well beyond that. For example, it allows two
parties to set up their computers so that the
buyer’s computer issues an order to purchase an
item, and the seller’s computer causes the item to
be sent on its way without further intervention by
the seller. For example, if a company kept its
supply of paper so that it could mechanically
determine when the supply was running low, its
computer could issue an order to an office supply
company for more paper, without any employee
of the buyer necessarily being aware that the
order had been placed. The office supply
company’s computer could cause a shipment of
paper to be made to the buyer with no conscious
intervention of any employees.
C. The Ethereum Platform
The Ethereum platform is a blockchain
platform created with flexibility to allow for smart
contracts. For our purposes, we need only
appreciate an example of its application in The
DAO transaction. The DAO structure allowed
persons to transfer Ether (the Ethereum
cryptocurrency, similar to bitcoin) to The DAO in
exchange for The DAO tokens — items that were
ownership interests in The DAO. Token owners

8

See Nick Szabo, “Formalizing and Securing Relationships on Public
Networks,” First Monday, Sept. 1, 1997, discussed in Kevin Werbach and
Nicolas Cornell, “Contracts Ex Machina,” 67 Duke L.J. 313 (2017).

voted to choose the investments to be made by
The DAO and shared ratably in gains and losses
9
of The DAO. Each token was recorded in the
blockchain. The intention was that the collected
funds would be invested in start-up companies. A
proposal brought to The DAO would be voted on
by the holders of The DAO tokens. If enough
holders approved of the investment, the
investment would be made by transferring Ether
from The DAO’s account to the account of the
successful applicant.10 Those who didn’t approve
of the investment could choose to take their
remaining Ether, leave The DAO’s main
blockchain and collect their Ether, or create
another blockchain. Besides their Ether, those
who moved to the new blockchain would also
receive “reward tokens.” Holders of the reward
tokens would receive from The DAO their
allocable portion of any distributions that The
DAO received from investments made while the
members of the new blockchain were still
members of the original blockchain of The DAO,
and from the proceeds of the disposition of those
earlier investments. All of this — the tallying of
the votes, the creation of a new blockchain, any
distributions to disapproving holders, the
investment of funds with successful applicants —
could be effected through smart contracts,
without the need for human intervention on
behalf of The DAO. In its implementation, The
DAO also made use of human “curators” who
confirmed the identity of those who submitted
proposals.

9

They did not exercise any control over leadership of The DAO (like
voting for the board of directors of a corporation) because The DAO’s
structure did not include any leadership positions.
10

The description of the operation of The DAO in this paragraph
comes from its formal presentation in Jentzsch, “Decentralized
Autonomous Organization to Automate Governance (Final Draft)” and
Stephen Tual, “On DAO Contractors and Curators,” Slock.it blog, Apr. 9,
2016. Note that voting was based on the number of DAO tokens owned.
Some have questioned whether it might be more democratic if each
holder had only one vote. See, e.g., Haseeb Qureshi, “Blockchains Should
Not Be Democracies,” Hacker Noon (Apr. 26, 2018); Muhammad Mehar
et al., “Understanding a Revolutionary and Flawed Grand Experiment in
Blockchain: The DAO Attack” (Nov. 26, 2017). This issue is analogous to
controversies that exist regarding the proper rules for voting in a
cooperative. See David J. Shakow, “From Rochdale Principles to LLCs:
The Ongoing Evolution of the Cooperative Structure,” Tax Notes, Aug. 2,
2004, p. 535.
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D. Blockchain Forks
A fork is created whenever the rules
governing the blockchain are changed. If the
change is made through a “soft fork,” a single
blockchain will remain, although some users may
continue using the old rules and won’t make use
of the features in the new software. If the change
is a “hard fork,” the result could be two
blockchains where one existed before, unless
everyone adopts the changed software. The
transactions that occurred before the hard fork
will be found on both blockchains. The hope and
expectation of those introducing the change that
leads to a hard fork is that holders will stop using
the older prong. However, as a practical matter, if
both blockchains remain active, anyone who held
an asset on the blockchain before the hard fork
will end up with two assets, one on each prong of
11
the forked blockchain.
E. Decentralized Autonomous Organization
As the above explanation hopefully makes
clear, a DAO is decentralized because control over
its operations does not reside in one place. It is
autonomous because the smart contracts that
govern its operation, when they operate properly,
control the operation of the entity without the
need for human intervention on behalf of the
DAO. And, as the name suggests, it is a form of
organization. The DAO was an early attempt to
implement a DAO structure. Although it
ultimately failed, it is useful to study because the
details of its intended operation were clearly
described.

the account of an investor making a withdrawal.
As a result, it was possible to make multiple
withdrawals of the same amount of Ether from an
ownership account in The DAO, and a rogue
investor did just that.13
When those observing The DAO’s operations
realized that much of its funds had been diverted,
14
two options presented themselves. On one hand,
this massive withdrawal of funds could be left
alone. A significant and vocal minority of The
DAO investors were in favor of this alternative.
The reason was that, as a matter of principle, these
investors believed strongly that anyone investing
in The DAO had to accept that the rules governing
its transactions would be precisely what was in
the computer code in The DAO’s programs.
Accordingly, a token holder’s ability to withdraw
more funds than it had invested was simply
another risk that investors necessarily had to
accept, just as they would have to accept that an
investment agreed upon might not be successful.
This is characterized as a holding that “code is
law.”15
The possibility that persons whose
investments had essentially been stolen would
support the position of the thief will seem
inconceivable to those who do not appreciate the
devotion of some to the idea that cyberspace
should operate without intervention from outside
16
authorities. In any event, when the theft was
discovered, a group of Robin Hoods who realized

13

See Emin Gün Sirer, “Thoughts on The DAO Hack,” Hacking
Distributed (June 17, 2016).
14

III. Why The DAO Failed
This grand experiment, which accumulated
more than $150 million from more than 11,000
12
investors, failed because of a programming error.
As noted above, anyone who disapproved of an
investment had the right to withdraw from The
DAO. Because of the programming error, The
DAO, on its books, did not immediately reduce

11

For a more technical explanation, see Noelle Acheson, “Hard Fork
vs. Soft Fork,” CoinDesk, Mar. 6, 2018.
12

David Siegel, “Understanding The DAO Hack for Journalists,”
Medium (June 16, 2016). The dollar amounts reported for this project
vary in different accounts depending on when the Ethers are translated
into dollars.

The computer code controlling DAO tokens prevented the rogue
investor from using the diverted tokens for 27 days, which gave time for
the alternatives discussed below to be debated. See Stephan Tual, “DAO
Security Advisory: Live Updates,” Slock.it blog, June 17, 2016.
15

The term comes from Lawrence Lessig, Code: And Other Laws of
Cyberspace 5 (2006) (footnotes omitted):
In real space, we recognize how laws regulate — through
constitutions, statutes, and other legal codes. In cyberspace we
must understand how a different “code” regulates — how the
software and hardware (i.e., the “code” of cyberspace) that make
cyberspace what it is also regulate cyberspace as it is. As William
Mitchell puts it, this code is cyberspace’s “law.” “Lex Informatica,”
as Joel Reidenberg first put it, or better, “code is law.”
A post in the name of the anonymous investor who had withdrawn
the funds apparently adopted this “code is law” view and took umbrage
at being characterized as a thief. See “Letter From ‘The Attacker,’” June
18, 2016. An analogous issue in the tax law is whether “substance”
should govern when a transaction seems to follow the form described in
the statute. See Joseph Isenbergh, “Musings on Form and Substance in
Taxation,” 49 U. Chi. L. Rev. 859 (1982). To prevent confusion among tax
practitioners reading this, the reference to “code” here is to computer
code, not the IRC.
16

See Lessig, supra note 15, passim.
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what was happening diverted The DAO’s
remaining Ether to a safe place for the benefit of
the other investors before anyone else could get
17
control of them.
Ultimately, this problem could be fixed only
through actions taken on the Ethereum
blockchain. The vast majority of those who
expressed their opinions wanted to undo the
theft. They voted for another option: the creation
of a hard fork of the Ethereum blockchain. As
noted, it is practically impossible for anyone to
introduce a counterfeit transaction into a
blockchain because the blockchain community
must approve of a new transaction, and a
counterfeit transaction would not pass muster
under this system. However, the community can
choose to disregard a host of transactions by
simply agreeing to ignore the portion of the
blockchain that contains the disapproved
transactions.
That is what happened here. Almost 90
percent of those in the Ethereum blockchain who
voted were in favor of rolling back the blockchain
to before the point at which the rogue investor
began transferring tokens to its account.18 The
Ethereum miners (the only ones who could
actually effect a change) then agreed to follow the
request of the Ethereum Foundation and upgrade
the Ethereum software. That created a hard fork
in the blockchain. One prong included the
transactions from the point that the rogue
investor’s activities began, plus any other
transactions that might follow this path after the
hard fork occurred. The other prong did not
include those transactions, instead functioning as
if all transactions in the portion of the original
blockchain that included the rogue investor’s
transactions never took place. It was anticipated
that most people using Ether would follow this
second prong.19

17

Jentzsch, supra note 1.

18

Antonio Madeira, “The DAO, the Hack, the Soft Fork and the Hard
Fork” (May 20, 2018). The significance of this overwhelming support for
the hard fork is undercut by the fact that only 4.5 percent of Ether (not
Ether holders) were voted at all, and apparently, holders of large blocks of
Ether played a major role: One voter cast more votes in favor than all the
votes cast against. See Vitalik Buterin, “Notes on Blockchain
Governance” (Dec. 17, 2017).
19

Pete Rizzo, “Ethereum Hard Fork Creates Competing Currencies,”
CoinDesk, July 24, 2016 (describing how the transactions using the old
prong, called Ethereum Classic, unexpectedly gained some value).

The investors in The DAO could not
themselves generate this solution. Creating a hard
fork in the Ethereum blockchain was a decision
that had to be made by those in the Ethereum
community. What probably influenced that
decision was that The DAO had accumulated
about 14 percent of all outstanding Ether in its
successful fundraising.20 Once the fork was
created, The DAO investors were able to retrieve
their investments and The DAO ceased to
function.
However, because not everyone agreed to the
solution, both blockchains (recording ownership
of Ether) remained active. While the new
blockchain became the one most investors looked
to, the old blockchain continued to be used. Thus,
anyone holding Ether from before the time of the
hard fork ended up with two assets instead of one:
Ether on the new blockchain and Ether on the old
21
blockchain (called Ethereum Classic). Although
Ethereum Classic is not as valuable as Ether on the
new blockchain, it became an additional asset of
those who held Ether before the hard fork
22
occurred.
Creating the hard fork disappointed those
who felt that code, once set out, is unalterable.
Indeed, discussions of smart contracts emphasize
that they have no flexibility because they lack
safety valves that an outside review would
23
provide. But as the solution to the problem
created by The DAO shows, a safety valve can be

20

Klint Finley, “A $50 Million Hack Just Showed That The DAO Was
All Too Human,” Wired, June 18, 2016; Siegel, supra note 12 (suggesting
that from the standpoint of the Ethereum blockchain, The DAO was “too
big to fail”).
21

Alyssa Hertig, “Ethereum’s Two Ethereums Explained” (July 28,
2016).
22

The tax result of such a hard fork might be additional income. See
discussion in American Bar Association Section of Taxation, “ABA Tax
Section Offers Suggestions for Cryptocurrency Guidance” (Mar. 20,
2018). The ABA tax section suggested that as an administrative matter,
hard forks occurring in 2017 (which would not include The DAO hard
fork) be treated as taxable events, but with an amount realized of zero.
This would have the effect of making the new assets generated by a hard
fork capital assets with a zero basis for most taxpayers, and would defer
income recognition regarding those assets to the time those assets were
disposed of. The American Institute of CPAs argued that no income
should be recognized because the additional asset received in the case of
a hard fork is unsolicited and extremely difficult to value. See AICPA,
“AICPA Seeks Updated Guidance on Tax Treatment of Virtual
Currency” (May 30, 2018) (section 6 of comment letter to IRS). The
practical result of this suggestion would seem to be the same as for the
ABA’s.
23

E.g., Jeremy Sklaroff, “Smart Contracts and the Cost of
Inflexibility,” 166 U. Pa. L. Rev. 263 (2017); R. Polk Wagner, “On Software
Regulation,” 78 S. Cal. L. Rev. 457, 462-463 (2005).
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found by using what is in effect a 51 percent attack
that those on the blockchain can agree to. The
hard fork used in the context of The DAO was an
extreme measure. But any change in the operation
of the blockchain left open by the blockchain’s
code that the community can agree to is available
as a backstop to unexpected applications of the
original code.
Note that the post hoc change in rules that was
applied in The DAO situation is not unique to the
blockchain world. It has been argued that the
same type of solution was used at the end of the
tulip craze in the 1600s. The rules governing
delivery under tulip contracts were changed so
that those committed by contract to buy tulips (at
extraordinarily high prices) could satisfy their
obligation by paying only 3.5 percent of the
24
contract price. Similarly, when Nelson Bunker
Hunt and William Herbert Hunt accumulated
substantial amounts of silver and contracts for the
delivery of silver (arguably setting up a corner of
the silver futures market), the commodity
exchanges simply changed their rules, ultimately
resulting in a substantial reduction of the Hunts’
wealth. It has been suggested that some of those
who made those decisions profited from the
25
change in the rules. This element of self-interest
may have played a role in the hard fork that saved
The DAO investors.26
IV. The SEC’s Decision on The DAO
Long after The DAO ceased functioning, the
SEC considered the treatment of The DAO’s
tokens under the securities laws.27 Its release
alerted those issuing blockchain-based tokens to
the SEC’s general views on these assets.
According to the SEC’s reasoning, a security
includes an investment contract, which is an
investment of money in a common enterprise

with a reasonable expectation of profits from the
efforts of others. Although the purchasers of The
DAO tokens could vote on proposals presented to
them, they were relying on the persons who
developed the structure and on the curators who
28
selected the proposals for them to vote on.
Because of the wide dispersion of ownership of
The DAO tokens and the anonymity of their
owners, the SEC concluded that the voting rights
granted to these ownership interests were “akin
to those of a corporate shareholder.” It followed
that interests like The DAO tokens normally
29
require registration under the securities laws.
V. First Tax Issue: Classification
The organizers of The DAO were very
concerned about their possible liability to
investors. Thus, there is language throughout the
documents that describe The DAO to potential
investors emphasizing that no “legally binding
30
contract” was created through the investment.
This was presumably intended to rebut any
claims that those who developed The DAO might
be responsible for any losses the investors
31
incurred. But it also suggests that while a DAO is
called an “organization,” its developers thought it
might not have any formal character for local law
purposes.
However, a surprising aspect of analyzing any
DAO for tax purposes (to someone not a tax
practitioner) is that it can be a tax entity. In some
sense, it appears like a disembodied creation

28

In a generally critical review of the SEC’s analysis, Professor
Randolph Robinson points out that Slock.it, the entity that created The
DAO, played no continuing role in its operation, and that the curators
were explicitly enjoined not to play a role in evaluating the proposals in
any way. Robinson, “The New Digital Wild West: Regulating the
Explosion of Initial Coin Offerings,” University of Denver Sturm College
of Law Working Paper No. 18-01, at 42-43 (Sept. 1, 2017).
29

24

This rule was adopted in the Dutch city of Haarlem and reportedly
in many other cities. Peter M. Garber, Famous First Bubbles: The
Fundamentals of Early Manias 62 (2000).
25

Jeffrey Williams, Manipulation on Trial: Economic Analysis and the
Hunt Silver Case 52-54 (1995). Professor Williams worked as an expert for
the defendant in a case arising from the activities of the Hunts, Minpeco
SA v. Hunt, 718 F. Supp. 168 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). The author of this report
served as an expert for the plaintiff.
26

Siegel, supra note 12 (“It may be noted that several people from the
Ethereum Foundation are DAO token holders and also have advisory
positions in The DAO.”).
27

SEC Release No. 81207, supra note 3.

In testimony in February, SEC Chair Jay Clayton said that “by and
large, the structures of [initial coin offerings (ICOs)] that I have seen
involve the offer and sale of securities and directly implicate the
securities registration requirements and other investor protection
provisions of our federal securities laws.” Testimony of Clayton before
the Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee,
“Chairman’s Testimony on Virtual Currencies: The Roles of the SEC and
CFTC” (Feb. 6, 2018). I discussed the tax treatment of holders of tokens
issued in ICOs in Shakow, “The Tax Treatment of Tokens: What Does It
Betoken,” Tax Notes, Sept. 11, 2017, p. 1387.
30

See “Additional Disclaimers” in “The Decentralized Autonomous
Organization (DAO) Framework.”
31

Quinn DuPont, “Experiments in Algorithmic Governance: A
History and Ethnography of ‘The DAO,’ a Failed Decentralized
Autonomous Organization,” Bitcoin and Beyond: Cryptocurrencies,
Blockchains and Global Governance 157, 163 (2018).
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floating in cyberspace, with no apparent form. Yet
as The DAO’s short history makes clear, the group
of investors in The DAO intended to consult
together to decide on investments, to make the
investments, and to share in the profits. They, and
those on the Ethereum blockchain, ultimately
worked together to resolve the problem created
by the rogue investor. Despite the disclaimers in
the material presenting The DAO to potential
investors, the structure operated very much like a
contract.32 Effectively, the computer code
governing the operation of The DAO was the
contract. Remember that no change was made in
the rules governing the operation of The DAO in
order to thwart the plan of the rogue investor.
Rather, a change was made in the operation of the
Ethereum blockchain by creating a hard fork in
that blockchain. And the possibility of a hard fork
was inherent in the rules governing the operation
of the Ethereum blockchain.33
In determining the status of The DAO for tax
purposes, classification for local law purposes is
not relevant (even assuming that the quoted
language about no legally binding contract had its
desired effect). In determining whether the
agreements entered into in creating The DAO, or
any similar entity, result in an entity for tax
purposes, the regulations state:
Whether an organization is an entity
separate from its owners for federal tax
purposes is a matter of federal tax law and
does not depend on whether the
organization is recognized as an entity
34
under local law.

32

Analyses of the relationship between smart contracts and
conventional contract law generally conclude that parties governed by
smart contracts are likely tied to the terms of the agreement at least as
strongly as those entering conventional contracts. See Sklaroff, supra note
23 (smart contracts more rigid than other contracts); Mark Flood and
Oliver Goodenough, “Contract as Automaton: The Computational
Representation of Financial Agreements,” OFR Working Paper 15-04
(Mar. 26, 2015) (a well-written contract can be made to function like a
contract a computer could work with); Werbach and Cornell, supra note
8, at 343 (“smart contracts are contracts”); but see Lauren Henry Scholz,
“Algorithmic Contracts,” 20 Stan. Tech. L. Rev. 128, 151 (2017) (there is a
very strong argument that arrangements like The DAO are not
enforceable).
33

This was reflected in a post purportedly from the rogue investor,
which argued against the creation of a hard fork because it would harm
the market value of Ether. See letter, supra note 15. The post did not argue
that this change could not be made.
34

Reg. section 301.7701-1(a)(1). See, e.g., Alhouse v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 1991-652, aff’d sub nom. Bergford v. Commissioner, 12 F.3d 166 (9th
Cir. 1993); Luna v. Commissioner, 42 T.C. 1067, 1077-1078 (1964).

The regulations go on to state what makes an
organization an entity separate from its owners:
A joint venture or other contractual
arrangement may create a separate entity
for federal tax purposes if the participants
carry on a trade, business, financial
operation, or venture and divide the
profits therefrom.35
Those regulations simply echo the language of
the statute:
The term “partnership” includes a
syndicate, group, pool, joint venture, or
other unincorporated organization
through or by means of which any
business, financial operation, or venture is
carried on, and which is not, within the
meaning of this title, a corporation or a
36
trust or estate.
Case law does not require much formality to
37
create a partnership for tax purposes. In Podell,
an oral agreement under which a taxpayer
supplied funds to allow another person to
rehabilitate homes, after which the two divided
the profits, was treated as a partnership. In
38
Bergford, taxpayers who were formally merely
co-owners of computer equipment were deemed
to be in a partnership with the manager of the
sale-leaseback program through which they
bought the equipment. The Court of Appeals
accepted the Tax Court’s conclusion that “the
economic benefits to the individual participants
were not derivative of their coownership of the
computer equipment, but rather came from their
joint relationship toward a common goal.”
Similarly here, the significance of holding an
interest in The DAO was the ability to vote on the
proposals brought to the attention of The DAO
and to share in any profits generated by the

35
36
37

Reg. section 301.7701-1(a)(2).
Sections 761(a) and 7701(a)(2).
Podell v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 429 (1970).

38

Bergford v. Commissioner, 12 F.3d 166, 169 (9th Cir. 1993). It should be
noted that the tax law will find an arrangement to be a partnership when
securities law might not. Thus, the SEC’s release on The DAO, supra note
3, concluded that The DAO was not a partnership because “the
pseudonymity and dispersion of the DAO Token holders made it
difficult for them to join together to effect change or to exercise
meaningful control.” The SEC’s analysis would not lead to a conclusion
that there was a partnership under the facts of Bergford.
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investment of the funds that were under the
control of the holders of The DAO tokens.
It is clear that The DAO, a group of investors
that intended to review investment proposals and
invest in some of the proposed ventures, was
carrying on a business or financial operation with
the intention of dividing the profits therefrom
with the others who invested in The DAO. The
DAO was expected to provide capital to chosen
investments, and those who bought into The DAO
were promised a share of any resulting profits. As
the effects of the diversion of Ether from The
DAO’s account showed, the investors would also
share in the losses of The DAO. All these
arrangements were inherent in the software
under which The DAO operated. It is worth
emphasizing that although it was a change in the
structure of Ethereum and the Ether issued
through it that frustrated much of the rogue
investor’s plans, if a change in the operation of
The DAO itself could have been made, it would
not change the analysis. Such a change is inherent
in the blockchain structure to the extent it allows
for soft forks and hard forks. Analogously, the
agreements governing the organization and
operation of a corporation or partnership are
subject to amendment, within the parameters of
the documents and local law.
Some recent cases have required that there be
significant sharing of income and losses to
support partner status.39 That position has been
40
strongly questioned. However, in a DAO, all
those contributing capital share proportionately
in the income and losses of the enterprise. Those
who invested Ether in The DAO were certainly in
a position to share the losses of the enterprise, as
became clear when the programming error in the
arrangement was exploited to potentially deplete
one-third of the money invested.
There are arrangements that do not rise to the
level of being a partnership, but The DAO’s
activities went beyond those exceptions. The
regulations exclude from being a partnership “a
joint undertaking, merely to share expenses” or
“mere co-ownership of property that is
maintained, kept in repair, and rented or leased.”

Those phrases do not describe The DAO. Also,
The DAO is not a trust for tax purposes because a
trust is an arrangement “whereby trustees take
title to property for the purpose of protecting or
conserving it for the beneficiaries under the
ordinary rules applied in chancery or probate
courts.” The DAO was not expected merely to
preserve the funds invested in it. Moreover, the
beneficiaries of a trust “do no more than accept
the benefits thereof and are not the voluntary
planners or creators of the trust arrangement.”41 In
contrast, the investors in The DAO were to be
actively involved in The DAO’s decisionmaking.42
That The DAO should be treated as an entity
for tax purposes does not suggest that all
blockchain-based assets are ownership interests
in tax entities. Pure cryptocurrencies, like bitcoin,
are based on a blockchain structure, but they do
not reflect an ownership interest in any entity.
Investors in bitcoin are looking for profits solely
from a change in the value of bitcoin. There is no
underlying entity whose profits will affect the
value of bitcoin. And as I have discussed at length
elsewhere, many tokens issued in initial coin
offerings are not interests in the issuing entity.43
But The DAO was an entity for tax purposes.
An entity like The DAO that was not organized
explicitly as a corporation could normally choose
to be treated either as a partnership or as a
corporation for federal income tax purposes.44
However, partnership classification is not
available for an entity that is classified as a
“publicly traded partnership.”45 A publicly traded
partnership is one whose interests are either
traded on an “established securities market” or
“are readily tradable on a secondary market (or
the substantial equivalent thereof).” Interests in
entities like The DAO can be bought and sold on
exchanges. The IRS has not ruled on whether such
exchanges are either “established securities

41

This activity would not usually rise to the level of “material
participation” for purposes of the passive loss rules of section 469. See
reg. section 1.469-5T.
43

39

See, e.g., TIFD III-E v. United States, 459 F.3d 220 (2d Cir. 2006).

44

40

McKee, Nelson, and Whitmire, Federal Taxation of Partnerships &
Partners, para. 3.02 (1996).

Both quotations are from reg. section 301.7701-4(a).

42

45

Shakow, supra note 29.
Reg. section 301.7701-2(b) and -3(a).
Section 7704.
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markets” or “secondary markets (or the
substantial equivalent thereof).”46
In any event, operating a DAO either as a
corporation or as a partnership will not mesh
easily with the rules of the IRC. There would have
been significant tax liabilities if The DAO had
operated as planned. Every investment made by
The DAO when it transferred Ether to a successful
47
applicant would be a taxable event to the DAO.
Any income earned from investments would be
either taxable to The DAO as a corporation or
taxable to its investors as a partnership. And any
time disgruntled investors who disapproved of an
investment withdrew from The DAO into a new
blockchain, taking their Ether and reward tokens
with them, there would be liquidating
distributions with tax consequences — both to the
entity and to the investors — that would have to
be determined. If The DAO is a U.S. taxpayer, it
will have to file a tax return and alert its owners to
any taxable income they have.
The obvious problem with applying those
conclusions in the real world is that the pure
blockchain structure intentionally omits a central
authority playing any role in its ongoing
operation. If a DAO is truly “autonomous,” those
who developed it and promoted it no longer have
any power to control it. Thus, in a DAO
blockchain, there is no one responsible for filing
the forms and returns needed by the tax system.
There is no one to file corporate or partnership tax
returns with the IRS; there is no one to furnish
forms K-1 or 1099 to the owners to inform them of

their income from the entities; and there is no one
to withhold from any payments made to owners48
49
(or, indeed, if it is appropriate, to withhold from
payments made to the miners, without whom the
blockchain would not be maintained). If forms are
not filed and amounts are not withheld, who will
be responsible for making the resulting payments
and paying any penalties that the IRS will levy?50
The most straightforward answer is that the
pure blockchain form does not work well for an
entity under the IRC. This fact was recognized by
the company Overstock.com, which issued
conventional stock using a blockchain structure.
Recognizing that it would have to comply with
SEC requirements (and, presumably, IRS
requirements), it used a blockchain structure that
included an entity, Overstock.com itself, that
could monitor and identify the actual owners of
its stock.51 Overstock.com would file its own tax
returns and furnish to stockholders, all of which it
could identify, the appropriate tax forms
reflecting such things as dividends paid to the
owners.
It would seem that any entity located in the
United States52 should use that type of structure in

48

A white paper of one DAO, ETF, supra note 5, recognizes the
potential for tax liabilities arising from its operations. The project tries to
avoid problems at the entity level by stating:
The Association’s tax affairs will be dealt with according to the law
of the land at the individual level, operating as a pass-through
entity with each token holder paying taxes in their local jurisdiction
relative to their own gains or losses.
ETF white paper, at 51. It characterizes its own legal status as follows:
The Association is a body corporate with its own legal identity. It is
separate from its office-bearers and token holders. The Association
will continue to exist even if the token holders change. The
association exists online and is governed in a digital jurisdiction for
managing decentralized autonomous organizations.
ETF white paper, at 50. As suggested in Section VI, operating in a digital
jurisdiction may not protect it from the Foreign Account Tax Compliance
Act rules.
49

Because the miners are working to maintain the blockchain, they
probably aren’t being paid by the entity making use of the Ether on the
blockchain. Whether a currency blockchain like bitcoin’s, which is not an
entity, can have any obligation to withhold on payments made to miners
is not considered here.
50

46

In his testimony in February, SEC Chair Clayton noted significant
differences between cryptocurrency exchanges and more traditional
exchanges. See testimony, supra note 29. A discussion of the different
services cryptocurrency exchanges may provide can be found in James
R. Brown and Franziska Hertel, “Virtual Currencies and the Commodity
Trading Safe Harbor,” Tax Notes, June 18, 2018, p. 1731.
47

Notice 2014-21, 2014-16 IRB 938, section 4, Q-6 (exchange of virtual
currency for another asset is a taxable disposition of the virtual
currency).

If the entity is a partnership, it will almost surely be subject to the
new partnership audit rules, sections 6221 through 6241, either because
it has more than 100 partners (section 6221(b)(1)(B)) or because it cannot
show that all its partners fit the description in section 6221(b)(1)(C). This
will result in more obligations and liabilities of the entity.
51

The S-3 registration statement says:
The personal identity information necessary to associate a public
key representing a given block of digital securities with the owner
of those securities will be maintained in a proprietary ledger
system that is not exposed to the public.

52

See the discussion in Section VII regarding the question of whether
the phrase “located in the United States” has any meaning in this
context.
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order to comply with IRC requirements. What
about an entity that is not located in the United
States? A foreign corporation or partnership not
within the jurisdiction of the United States cannot
be required to file forms that conform with IRC
requirements. However, owners of such entities
who are U.S. taxpayers must still obtain the
information they need to properly complete their
own tax returns. This would be especially
important if the DAO were a partnership, because
a partner must include its share of income on its
tax return, even if the income has not yet been
53
distributed to the partner. A U.S. investor who
plans to comply with the tax law would be wise to
ensure that it will get that information before
entering into this type of investment.
VI. Second Tax Issue: FATCA
But there is another potential problem in the
case of any DAO that is located outside the United
States and is not subject to U.S. jurisdiction. To
prevent U.S. taxpayers from hiding their assets
overseas, the United States has developed rules
54
under the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act.
FATCA requires entities that may be dealing with
U.S. taxpayers to report information about those
taxpayers and their financial transactions to the
IRS. If they fail to do so, any payment made to
them becomes subject to an automatic 30 percent
withholding tax that must be collected by anyone
55
making payments to those entities.
It would appear that a DAO would be a
56
foreign financial institution under FATCA. The

53

IRC includes as a financial institution an entity
engaged in investing in securities or partnership
57
interests. The IRS includes within that category
58
“private equity and venture capital funds.” A
foreign entity organized like The DAO would
seem to fit that description. That would be true of
any DAO whose goal was to invest the funds it
receives from its investors. Hence, if it were not a
U.S. entity, it would be an FFI.
An FFI is encouraged to enter into an
agreement with the IRS. Under the agreement, the
FFI commits to identifying whether its account
holders are U.S. taxpayers and to supplying
information to the IRS regarding payments to
those taxpayers. If it cannot determine whether an
account holder is a U.S. taxpayer, it must
withhold 30 percent from any payment to that
account holder. Given the anonymity of the
blockchain, a DAO that enters into an agreement
with the IRS would be withholding on any
payment made to an account holder that did not
properly identify itself to the entity.
If an FFI does not enter into an agreement with
59
the IRS, any payment of interest or dividends to
the nonparticipating FFI by a U.S. person (or by a
participating FFI) must have 30 percent withheld
60
from it. Thirty percent withholding is also
required from the gross proceeds of the sale by the
nonparticipating FFI of an interest that can
61
produce U.S.-source interest or dividends. Thus,
the nonparticipating FFI would have 30 percent of
its proceeds of any sale of stock in an investment
withheld if it sold the interest to a U.S. entity or
one that had an FFI agreement with the IRS.62 This
would cover many potential buyers.
If an entity like The DAO does not qualify as
an FFI, it would be a nonfinancial foreign entity
(NFFE). In general, payments to NFFEs made by a
U.S. entity or a participating FFI are subject to 30
percent withholding. The NFFE can avoid such
withholding only if it can represent to the payer

Section 702(c).

54

Sections 1471 through 1474. I do not discuss the question of
whether a taxpayer owning an interest in a DAO would be treated as
owning a foreign asset, with possible reporting requirements under the
foreign bank account reporting rules and for purposes of Form 8938. For
a recent discussion of that issue, see ABA, “ABA Members Submit
Comments on Voluntary Compliance Programs” (May 3, 2018).
55

Sections 1471(a) and 1472(a).

56

The AICPA has suggested that centralized virtual currency
exchanges located outside the United States would qualify as FFIs.
Accordingly, someone whose virtual currency is held by the exchange
could be required to report the holdings under the rules of FATCA and
FBAR requirements. See AICPA letter, supra note 22, at section 12.

57
58

Section 1471(d)(5)(C).
Notice 2010-60, 2010-37 IRB 329, section II.A.3.

59

More precisely, U.S.-sourced fixed and determinable annual or
periodic income, as defined in section 1473(1)(A)(i).
60
61

Section 1471(b)(1)(D)(i).
Section 1473(1)(A)(ii).

62

Reg. section 1.1473-1(a)(3)((ii)(A). It does not appear that the sale of
a partnership interest would require withholding.
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that it has no substantial U.S. owners or it
provides information about U.S. owners to the
63
U.S. payer or FFI. A DAO would normally have
difficulty making that representation.
It is worth noting that while ownership in a
DAO is anonymous, a DAO that attempted to
enforce tax-related requirements (for example, by
asking its owners to reveal their identities) would
have some power over uncooperative holders of
their tokens. Given the centrality of anonymity in
the blockchain structure, a DAO that had not
adopted the Overstock.com structure might be
reluctant to request identifying information from
the holders of its tokens. However, to the extent a
DAO was itself subject to any taxes or penalties, it
could try to require its token holders to pay their
proportional share of those payments. The rules
governing a DAO could provide that a holder
who did not cooperate with a request from the
DAO (regarding a tax issue or anything else, for
that matter) would lose its voting rights and the
right to receive any distributions from the DAO.
This is because while the holders of DAO tokens
are anonymous, the addresses (that is, the
locations on the blockchain) of those who can vote
or receive distributions from a DAO must be
known to the DAO — otherwise, it would not be
possible to confirm their right to vote and their
right to receive distributions.64 Presumably, if an
address were blacklisted in terms of voting and
65
receiving distributions, the transferee would also
be subject to the same penalties until whatever
caused the address to be penalized was corrected.
This might mean that the DAO would have to
provide a service to potential transferees
confirming whether the token they plan to buy is
limited in any way. Of course, adding these
trappings of an organized entity would be
somewhat inconsistent with the attempt to create
a totally autonomous entity, but perhaps these
procedures could be programmed in a smart
contract so they would operate without human
intervention.

63

The reader may have noted one point missing
from much of the above discussion: If a DAO
retains the usual blockchain structure and does
not keep a record of its owners, how are any tax
liabilities enforced? After all, one of the beauties
of the blockchain structure is that no one can
identify who owns the assets listed on the
blockchain.
A. Taxation of Owners
There are several levels of response to that
question. First, many people file their tax returns
honestly. The absence of a Form 1099 will not
deter them from including appropriate income
items on their tax returns.
Those who are tempted to ignore the income
from a DAO operating with a standard
blockchain may be encouraged by the fact that,
unlike investors in Swiss bank accounts and the
like, there is no danger of a whistleblower
revealing their identity,66 because there is no
central authority with a list of all the DAO’s
investors.
However, as those who have failed to include
their bitcoin (and other cryptocurrency)
transactions on their tax returns have learned, the
IRS can obtain records of exchanges when holders
of blockchain currencies convert their holdings
into fiat currencies — dollars and other
67
conventional government-issued currencies.
This may encourage investors who wish to hide
their income to use exchanges that are not subject
to U.S. jurisdiction. It is unclear the extent to
which other countries might cooperate with an
attempt by the United States to obtain information
from exchanges outside U.S. jurisdiction. Many
countries are concerned with cryptocurrencies
because of their potential to aid criminal
68
activities. An ideal solution would involve
international cooperation to obtain information
from cryptocurrency exchanges. Absent such

66

Section 1472(a) and (b).

64

See Jentzsch, supra note 10, at 2; and Madeira, supra note 18.

65

VII. Enforcement

It is possible to “blacklist” items in a blockchain using a soft fork.
See Siegel, supra note 12 (Vitalik Buterin of the Ethereum Foundation
suggested using a soft fork in the Ethereum blockchain to blacklist the
misappropriated Ether from The DAO).

See Bradley Birkenfeld, Lucifer’s Banker: The Untold Story of How I
Destroyed Swiss Bank Secrecy (2016).
67

United States v. Coinbase Inc., No. 3:17-cv-01431 (N.D. Cal. 2017).

68

Irish Department of Finance, “Virtual Currencies and Blockchain
Technology” (Mar. 23, 2018) (discusses countries that have formally
banned bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies).
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cooperation, a FATCA-like solution might be
developed to deter the use of foreign exchanges.
B. Taxation of the Entity
If DAOs begin to proliferate, they are likely to
command the attention of the OECD project on
base erosion and profit shifting.69 The
international concern with base erosion is focused
on “stateless income” — income that through
sophisticated tax planning is not treated as
70
income in any jurisdiction. If a DAO can
successfully assert that it “exists online and is
governed in a digital jurisdiction for managing
71
decentralized autonomous organizations,” those
trying to avoid all taxing jurisdictions will no
longer need complicated structures to gain their
desired result.
There is certainly a serious question about
how an entity formed as a DAO can be located in
any physical place. If a DAO adopts a structure
72
like that of Overstock.com, the location of the
entity that is in charge of that DAO may properly
be referred to as the DAO’s location. But
otherwise, identifying a location of a DAO may
not be a meaningful exercise under our current
73
rules of jurisdiction. I have previously written
about the difficulty of identifying the location for
tax purposes of items located in the cloud.74 But a
cloud arrangement at least consists of a set of
physical computer servers. A DAO is located in
cyberspace, so that it could be viewed either as
everywhere or nowhere. The German
company Slock.it developed The DAO, but The
DAO structure was intentionally removed from
Slock.it’s ownership and made available to
75
anyone who wanted to use that structure.

69

Information about BEPS can be found at the OECD website.

70

See Edward D. Kleinbard, “Stateless Income,” 11 Fla. Tax Rev. 699
(2011).
71

The language is from the ETF white paper, quoted in supra note 48.

72

See supra text accompanying note 51.

The legal ramifications and treatment of an
entity like The DAO have not been discussed
much in the legal literature. Professor Lawrence
Lessig distinguishes between the internet and
cyberspace.76 Messages are sent on the internet;
purchases are made on the internet. The messages
are sent between entities that exist in the real
world; the purchases are made from sellers who
have a real-world existence. Much of the legal
literature dealing with new technologies focuses
on those interactions occurring over the internet.
But The DAO itself existed nowhere other than in
cyberspace. Its operations were carried out by
means of its code. If you try to look for an entity
like The DAO in the world, you will find that
there is no there there. While its owners were real
entities — however hard it might have been to
identify them — and while The DAO’s
investments would have been made in the real
world, the entity itself existed only in cyberspace.
Conventional analysis could not sensibly connect
it to any one location on Earth.
The BEPS project is clearly focused on the
77
digital economy. The possibility that there might
be international cooperation under BEPS at all
arose from the recognition of the serious loss of
revenue to all countries because of sophisticated
tax planning, among other things. If the DAO
structure cannot fairly be located in any
jurisdiction, it would seem to embody a classic
generator of stateless income. A growth in the use
of DAOs could well lead to international
cooperation to tax the income of DAOs.
One way of getting some control over DAOs
would be to insist that cryptocurrency exchanges
make available the identities of those trading on
them. To a significant degree, entities running
wallet applications (where most cryptocurrency
investors store their holdings) already require
anti-money-laundering/know-your-customer
78
checks upon sign-up. If all nations charged
exchanges with the responsibility of knowing
who their customers are, and customers trading
on exchanges realized that their identities would

73

See generally David R. Johnson and David Post, “Law and Borders
— The Rise of Law in Cyberspace,” 48 Stan. L. Rev. 1367 (1996); David G.
Post, In Search of Jefferson’s Moose: Notes on the State of Cyberspace, ch. 11
(2009).
74

Shakow, “The Taxation of Cloud Computing and Digital Content,”
Tax Notes, July 22, 2013, p. 333.
75

Jentzsch, supra note 1. The SEC release, supra note 3, concluded that
Slock.it retained significant effective influence over The DAO’s actions.

76

Lessig, supra note 15, at 9.

77

Action 1 of the BEPS project is called “Addressing the Tax
Challenges of the Digital Economy.”
78

Kevin Werbach, The Blockchain and the New Architecture of Trust 179
(2018) (coming).

940

TAX NOTES, AUGUST 13, 2018
For more Tax Notes content, please visit www.taxnotes.com.

© 2018 Tax Analysts. All rights reserved. Tax Analysts does not claim copyright in any public domain or third party content.

SPECIAL REPORT

be made known to tax authorities, it would make
hiding behind a blockchain more and more
difficult. Whether such a level of international
cooperation could be achieved is certainly
unclear.
But this solution assumes that we can locate
exchanges in a jurisdiction. If exchanges can
themselves operate solely in cyberspace, with no
connection to any jurisdiction, governments will
need to find another way of dealing with the DAO
phenomenon.
Another player that governments might be
able to pursue would be an entity that was known
79
to interact with a DAO. For example, The DAO
planned to bring investment proposals to its
owners, and to fund entities whose proposals the
owners approved of. Profits would result from
distributions from those entities and from gains
on the disposition of those investments. Taxing
authorities might require entities receiving those
invested funds — assuming they operate outside
of cyberspace — to withhold from payments
going to any DAO that was not complying with
tax reporting requirements. And if a DAO’s
ownership interests in those entities were
transferred on conventional exchanges,
withholding could be applied to the proceeds of
any sale of an interest by a noncomplying DAO.
Again, that could only succeed with substantial
international cooperation.

be easy for tax administrators to discover who
should be taxed on the income of a DAO.


VIII. Conclusion
There is no evidence that entities structured
like The DAO have considered the likelihood that
they are subject to various requirements under the
tax laws. The simple solution for those that want
to comply would be to use blockchains like that of
80
Overstock.com, which allow an outside entity to
oversee the ownership registry of the DAO. If
they fail to do so, they may find that they are
subject to limitations under FATCA or may be
subject to penalties imposed by the IRS and
collected, if possible, from their owners. But there
remains a significant possibility that absent
international cooperation and innovation, it won’t

79

This point was suggested to me by Professor Reed Shuldiner.

80

See supra note 51.
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